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Indirect Effects in Cost-Benefit Analysis
Jan Rouwendal
Abstract
The debate about the effectiveness of investments in public infrastructure initiated by
Aschauer suggests that there may be substantial discrepancies between the results of conventional
cost-benefit analysis and the ultimate effects of such investments on welfare. This paper takes
a closer look at this issue by investigating the existence of secondary or indirect effects under
conditions of monopolistic competition. We find that such effects will in general exist, and that
they are potentially large, but that they can also be negative, depending on the specification of the
model. With linear demand curves, indirect effects can be positive, zero or negative, with Dixit-
Stiglitz they are always nonnegative and closely related to the taste for diversity, while with the
logit model they are always identically zero. Free entry reinforces the positive indirect effects in the
Dixit-Stiglitz model, and causes negative indirect effects in the logit model. Given this variety of
results, robust empirical measurement of the indirect effects appears to be difficult.
KEYWORDS: project evaluation, indirect (or secondary) effects, monopolistic competition
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 1 Introduction 
 
In many countries plans for investments in infrastructure are subject to public 
debate in which those who are in favour of it tend to stress the importance of good 
infrastructure not only for those who (hope to) benefit directly from the 
investment, but for the total economy. According to this argument, there are, at 
least potentially, substantial secondary or indirect effects of improvements in 
public infrastructure that should be taken into account. 
However, the point that there can also be substantial indirect effects 
associated with investment in public infrastructure that are neglected in private 
investment analysis but should be taken into account in social CBA is generally 
regarded as problematic. Standard texts on benefit-cost analysis, for instance 
Boardman et al. (2005), discuss the case of valuing costs and benefits in distorted 
markets and describe how negative effects in primary markets could under some 
conditions be outweighed by positive impacts in secondary markets in a second-
best world. Although the theoretical motivation for including indirect effects in 
CBA is therefore in principle as clear as that for incorporation of externalities 
which was forcefully made by Pigou (1920) and others, an important difference is 
that the significance of these indirect effects is difficult to assess in actual 
situations and that even their sign can be indeterminate. For this reason, the 
profession tends to be rather sceptical about the incorporation of indirect or 
secondary effects in CBA. 
Indeed, there are prominent examples of misuse of indirect effect 
arguments in CBA, for example by the Bureau of Reclamation in economic 
assessments of large water projects in the U.S. in the first half of the 20th century 
(see Eckstein, 1958) and even present day analyses do not always fully deal with 
the complexity of this accounting.1 
An elementary, but important issue is the danger of double counting 
associated with the incorporation of secondary effects in social CBA. Take the 
example of investments in public infrastructure. They result in changes in the 
price of one or more goods, such as transport or communication.  The direct effect 
of such a price change is the increase in the surplus under the demand curve of 
that good. If it is a consumer good, the surplus is the consumer surplus and the 
welfare effect is clearly identical to the direct effect. If it is an input or an 
intermediate good, it is not obvious that the direct effect is identical to the 
ultimate effect that the price change will have on consumer welfare. That ultimate 
effect will be realized through a (possibly complicated) sequence of indirect 
effects. The simplest possibility is that the input is used to produce a consumer 
good, but it is also possible that it will be used to produce another intermediate 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Bhatia et al. (eds) (2009). Some of the studies in this book do not adequately 
account for opportunity costs, and suffer from other serious shortcomings. 
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 good and that consumer goods will only be affected through a sequence of input-
output relations. In the course of this process, the profits or the number of firms 
may change in the industries through which the effect passes, unemployment may 
decrease and the prices of some consumer goods may go down. Since it is not 
obvious that the ultimate effect on consumer welfare is equal to the direct effect 
there are potentially indirect effects. 
This discussion makes clear that for the purposes of social CBA one 
should look for differences between the direct effect (the change in surplus under 
the demand function of the product whose price changes) and the ultimate effect 
of this price change on consumer welfare. Only the difference between the 
ultimate effect and the initial effect, which could be called the additional indirect 
effect, is relevant for social CBA. It may not always be easy to identify such 
additional indirect effects and to determine their size. 
The relevance of indirect effects for social CBA may be illustrated by the 
debate on the effects of public investment initiated by Aschauer (1989), who 
argued that the effects of investments in public infrastructure are empirically very 
large. His results suggested that conventional cost benefit analysis underestimates 
the total gains associated with such expenditure and hence the presence of 
important additional indirect effects. The ensuing debate, reviewed in Gramlich 
(1994), questioned the original results of Aschauer in many ways. However, one 
feature that has been highlighted is the stimulating effect that public infrastructure 
has on private investment (see Munnel, 1992). Nevertheless, one can easily argue 
that investment in traffic infrastructure will naturally generate some spatial 
redistribution of economic activities which may appear in the data as investment 
activity. The associated welfare effects may therefore be properly taken into 
account if the long run demand curve for transport is used for the determination of 
the direct effect. If this is indeed the case, it would be wrong to interpret the 
investment activity as an indirect effect that has to be added to the change in 
consumer surplus. 
This discussion makes clear that it is difficult to assess the importance of 
indirect effects because a chain of cross-market price effects is involved, while the 
magnitudes, types and interactions of economic distortions that would affect their 
size are often not known sufficiently well. Presumably for this reason, many 
empirical pieces that acknowledge the existence of indirect effects either bring the 
issue up as an after-thought or discuss a special case only.2 This paper attempts to 
contribute to improve the analyses of indirect effects by formalizing their 
derivation under imperfect competition when inputs or intermediate goods are 
involved in a general way. By doing this, it will be shown that even for certain 
common models found in the literature, under certain circumstances, contrary to 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, Moreno et al. (2002) for an in-depth analysis of the specific effect of 
investments in public infrastructure on the performance of manufacturing industries. 
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 what many might think, these indirect effects are not insignificant. In fact the 
magnitudes can be extremely large. Furthermore, there are also circumstances 
under which the indirect effects can be negative. The paper provides a rigorous 
way in which these indirect effects can be derived. In the next section we start 
with a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 contains a brief discussion of the 
monopoly situation that serves to introduce the methodology used in the next two 
sections and provides a useful starting point for the analysis of indirect effects 
under monopolistic competition. Section 4 introduces the class of models studied 
in the present paper and provides an analysis for situations in which the number of 
firms is fixed. Section 5 considers the situation of free entry. In section 6 a 
number of specific examples are discussed. Section 7 concludes with a discussion 
of the implications for social CBA. 
 
2 A review of the relevant literature 
 
The theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) evaluates an investment on the basis 
of its effects on welfare (see, for instance, Drèze and Stern, 1986). In principle 
this requires the use of a general equilibrium model to determine the values of the 
determinants of welfare before and after the realization of the project. This 
‘conceptually straightforward approach’ (Diewert, 1983) is often difficult to carry 
out in practice, thus partial equilibrium analyses are more common. 
This is an important reason why applications often concentrate on the 
direct effects, and then make appropriate adjustments for market failures like 
external effects. This practice means that apart from market failures the CBA is 
identical to the assessment a private entrepreneur would make. In all market 
economies, private investment decisions are taken in this way, and it is well 
known that the implied focus of attention on the direct effects is correct if the 
economy operates under perfect competition. This practice implies that 
investments that result in improvements in the production of intermediate 
products (and therefore have no direct effects on consumer welfare) can 
nevertheless be evaluated by the induced change in the area under their demand 
curve because all decreases in cost will be transformed into equivalent decreases 
in the price of final products. Analogously, social CBA of public investment that 
does not (or partly) concern consumers can be restricted to a consideration of the 
direct effects. For instance, if a new road is constructed, it is sufficient to compare 
the cost of this investment with the benefits as measured by the consumer surplus 
under the demand curve for trips on this road, even though there may be 
measurable effects of its construction in other sectors as well.  
This argument has been put forward by Hicks (1946a, b), who argued that 
the effect of a decrease in the price of an input (for instance because of a subsidy) 
can be measured equivalently as the change in consumers’ surplus under the 
3
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 demand curve for the input concerned, or through the changes in the consumers’ 
surpluses of the demand curves of the final products that used this input. Hicks’ 
analysis was used by Sugden and Williams (1978) who give the example of a 
decrease in transport cost, which leads to a change in housing demand. In that 
case the welfare effect can be measured in two equivalent ways: as the change in 
consumers’ surplus under the demand curve for transport (the direct effect) or as 
the change in consumers’ surplus under the demand curve for housing (an indirect 
effect). Incorporating both effects in a CBA would imply (literally) double 
counting. Blackorby and Donaldson (1999) provide a more formal analysis of 
Hicks’ equivalence proposition and prove its validity in the context of an 
economy with perfect competition. 
The proposition that the welfare effect of changes in input prices can be 
measured completely by changes in consumers’ surplus under the demand curve 
for an input (that is, a commodity that is not directly consumed at all) was 
considered from a different angle,3 and formally proved, in a series of articles in 
the American Economic Review in the 1970s.4 These analyses use partial 
equilibrium models of an industry that produces a consumer good and consider 
the effect of a change in the price of one input. For the purposes of the present 
paper it is important that also some attention was paid to the monopoly case. This 
made clear that the welfare effect of a decrease in the price of a monopolist’s 
input was not completely measured by its direct effect.5 In the next section we 
return to that model and use it as a starting point for the analysis in subsequent 
sections.  
These two branches of literature make it abundantly clear that under 
perfect competition indirect effects should never be incorporated into a social 
CBA in addition to direct effects. Additional indirect effects can only occur with 
market imperfections. In other words: additional indirect effects have to be taken 
into account into social CBA for the same reason as environmental damage and 
other relevant welfare consequences of market failure. 
At the end of the 1970s interest in markets characterized by monopolistic 
competition increased and this type of models have become very useful standard 
tools of economic analysis since then. The ‘monopolistic competition revolution’ 
has transformed the field of international trade and economic geography. The 
international trade literature that uses models based on monopolistic competition 
provides interesting suggestions about the presence of indirect effects. For 
instance, in a review of the literature on regional economic integration Baldwin 
                                                          
3 It appears that this second branch of literature emerged independently of Hicks’ analysis. 
4 This discussion focused on the measurement of the welfare effect of a change in the price of an 
input of an industry producing a consumers’ good. See Schmalensee (1971), Wisecarver (1974), 
Anderson (1976), Schmalensee (1976) and Jacobsen (1979).  
5 See especially Schmalensee (1971), Jacobsen (1979). 
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 and Venables (1995) conclude that the welfare effects of regional economic 
integration ‘may be many times larger if industries are imperfectly, rather than 
perfectly competitive’ (Baldwin and Venables, 1995, p. 1606). They illustrate this 
with a Dixit-Stiglitz model of imperfect competition and iceberg transport costs in 
the context of a model in which two to three countries integrate. One reason is the 
shift of industries towards the integrating countries; another is the larger scale of 
production in the integrated economies. However, the authors observe that 
unambiguous general results on the net effects of economic integration are 
difficult to obtain. Baldwin et al. (2003) use a similar framework for the 
decomposition of the welfare effects in their analysis of trade policies.6 The 
analysis of these two review papers suggests that imperfect competition can make 
a substantial difference for the evaluation of public policy. The indirect effects of 
public policy that are the subject of the present paper arise in much the same way 
as these non-traditional effects of trade policy, but they are not related to the 
relocation of firms across national boundaries. It remains to be seen therefore 
whether simular results will show up. In economic geography the main 
development was, of course, Krugman’s core periphery model which implies that 
under monopolistic competition small differences in transport costs can have large 
implication for the geographical structure of economic geography. 
Closer to the topic of the present paper are a few studies that concentrate 
on the effects of imperfect competition in the context of a non-spatial CBA. 
Venables and Gasiorek (1998) have provided simulation results that suggest that 
in an economy with vertical linkages where industries are characterized by 
monopolistic competition, the benefits of transport improvements may be 
substantially larger than is suggested by conventional cost-benefit analysis in 
which attention is restricted to direct effects. On the other hand, Newbery (1998) 
provided counterexamples that show that in some situations conventional cost-
benefit analysis might overestimate the welfare gains from public investment. 
That analysis shows that additional indirect effects may well be negative. Bröcker 
(1998) presents a related analysis of the welfare-improving effects of a transport 
subsidy in a Hotelling-Smithies type of partial spatial equilibrium. The models 
used in these papers are rather specific and it is therefore unclear what level of 
generality can be attached to them. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this review is that the question 
about the importance of additional indirect effects is still open in the context of 
market imperfections. Additional indirect effects are consequences of market 
failures that should in principle be taken into account in a social CBA. There are 
important suggestions from models of imperfect competition in related fields that 
suggest they can be substantial. Moreover, there are some specific examples of 
cases in which they are positive and indeed substantial and also one in which it 
                                                          
6 Their chapter 17 on infrastructure policies is mainly concerned with economic growth.  
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 the additional indirect effect is negative. It is the purpose of the present paper to 
address the question about the relevance of additional indirect effects for social 
CBA for a class of models that cover a number of popular specifications of 
monopolistic competition to see if general conclusions with respect to the sign and 
magnitude of additional indirect effects can be derived. This will be done by 
adopting the framework of Schmalensee (1971) and the related literature in the 
context of imperfect competition. That is: we consider an industry that produces a 
consumer good and consider the effect of a change in an input price. In particular, 
we ask the question whether such a change in an input price generates additional 
indirect effects. The decrease in price may, for instance, have been caused by an 
investment in public infrastructure such as a road or glass fibre cable network. 
The framework adopted here is probably the simplest one in which 
additional indirect effects can occur and seems therefore a natural starting point. 
Possible generalizations will be discussed in the concluding section of this paper. 
 
3 Monopoly 
 
In this section we introduce the methodology to be used for the analysis of 
monopolistic competition by means of a brief reconsideration the monopoly 
situation. We assume that the monopolist produces a single product,7 takes the 
demand function for its output as given and is able to set the price of its output. It 
does so in order to maximize its profits, which are defined as: 
 
pxryZ −= , 1 
 
where Z denotes profits, r the price of the firm’s output, which is a consumers’ 
good, y its output volume, p the vector of input prices and x input volumes. The 
demand for the firm’s output is a function of its price: y=y(r). 
The maximization problem can be considered as consisting of two parts: 
minimization of the cost K at a given output volume and determination of the 
optimal output volume. Cost minimization leads to a cost function, which we 
denote as K(p,y). Substitution of the demand function and the cost function into 
the definition of profits leads to the firm’s profit function, which has the price r as 
the firm’s only remaining decision variable: 
 
))(,()( rypKrryZ −=  2 
The welfare effect of a change in the price of an input is measured as the change 
in social surplus ΔSS, i.e. sum of the changes in consumers’ surplus ΔCS and in 
profits ΔZ: 
                                                          
7 Jacobsen (1979) has also looked at multiproduct firms. 
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ZCSSS Δ+Δ=Δ  3 
 
The change in social surplus gives the ultimate effect of the input price on welfare 
and is therefore equal to what has been called in the introductory section the 
indirect effect. It has to be compared with the direct effect that will be defined 
below. 
The change in consumers’ surplus occurs because of the change in the 
(profit maximizing) output price induced by the change in the input price. Let the 
changing input price be that of the i-th input. We denote its initial value with a 
superfix 0 and its new value with a superfix 1.Then we can write for the change in 
consumers’ surplus: 
 
∫=Δ
0
1
)(
i
i
p
p
i
i
dp
dp
drryCS  4 
 
The change in profits equals: 
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 5 
 
where yKmc ∂∂= , the marginal cost; the second line makes use of (2) and takes 
into account that the output price r depends on pi, and also that output volume y is 
influenced by pi. The change in output volume influences revenues as well as 
costs. 
The first expression on the right-hand-side in the second line of (5) is 
equal to minus the change in consumers’ surplus. The change in social surplus is 
therefore equal to the sum of the second and third term:  
 
i
p
p i
p
p i
dp
p
Kdz
p
r
r
ymcrSS
i
i
i
i
∫∫ ∂∂+∂∂∂∂−−=Δ
0
1
0
1
)(  6 
The first term on the right-hand-side of (6) (including the minus-sign) is positive 
when the price exceeds marginal cost, since the demand curve is negatively 
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 sloped and the output price is an increasing function of the input price.8 The 
second term is also positive. 
The direct effect of the input price change is the induced change in the 
area under the input demand curve. In measuring this change, we should take into 
account that input demand might change because of substitution between inputs 
and because of a change in the demand for the final output. The latter is the result 
of the change in the price of the output induced by the changing input price. 
Denoting the input demand curve as xi(p,y(r)), and taking into account that the 
profit maximizing price is a function of the input prices, we define the direct 
effect of the price change as ΔS:  
 
.
)))((,(
0
1
0
1
i
p
p i
p
p
ii
dp
p
K
dpprypxS
i
i
i
i
∫
∫
∂
∂=
=Δ
 7 
 
where the second line makes use of the fact that the demand xi(p,y(r)) is the partial 
derivative of the cost function with respect to the price of input i. 
Comparison of eqs. 6 and 7 reveals that apart from the direct effect, there 
is an indirect effect (IE) associated with the lower input price, that is overlooked 
by conventional cost-benefit analysis: 
 
.)(
0
1
∫ ∂∂⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∂
∂−−=
i
i
p
p
i
i
dp
p
r
r
ymcrIE  8 
 
The expression under the integral sign is the product of the difference between 
price and marginal cost, (the absolute value of) the slope of the demand curve and 
the partial derivative of the output price with respect to the price of the i-th input. 
The IE is positive only when the price differs from the marginal cost. Moreover, it 
is clear from (8) that the presence of a nonzero IE requires a downward sloping 
demand curve, which is a necessary condition for monopoly behavior. There is a 
close relation between the price elasticity of demand and the size of the indirect 
effect: with zero price elasticity the IE is also zero, while it increases in the 
absolute value of the price elasticity.  
 The formula therefore shows that there is an intimate relation between the 
presence of an IE and monopolistic behavior. Indeed, the reason for the beneficial 
                                                          
8 This follows from the first order condition for profit maximization if marginal cost is increasing 
in the price of input i. 
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 IE is that a decrease in the price of an input decreases this market distortion 
caused by this behavior to some extent and may therefore be viewed as a second 
best measure to cure this effect. The effect of such a decrease is related to that of a 
subsidy given to the monopolist and the presence of an IE is therefore related to 
the well known ‘paradoxical result’ (Tirole, 1988, p. 68) that welfare increases 
when a monopolist’s output is subsidized. The reason is that the monopolists’ 
product is underconsumed, and the subsidy corrects for this distortion. The lower 
input price has a similar effect as a subsidy when it leads to a lower output price. 
Note, finally, that a nonnegative IE requires that the change in the input price 
induces a change in the output price. This condition is violated if the input only 
affects the fixed cost of production. 
The various effects are illustrated in Figure 1, which refers to a monopolist 
with a linear demand curve and constant marginal cost. The figure shows the 
effect of a decrease in the marginal cost, which has been caused by a lower input 
price. The change in the marginal cost induces the monopolist to set a lower 
output price, which causes an increase in consumer surplus, as indicated by the 
vertically shaded area. The lower price in itself implies lower profits, but this 
effect is more than compensated by the decrease in the monopolist’s lower cost, 
given by the direct effect, and the additional indirect effect, which is equal to the 
mark up times the additional output. 
Jacobsen (1979) observed that, apart from its (positive) sign, little can be 
learned from (8) in general. It is indeed the case that is gives us very little 
information about the size of the additional indirect effect apart from it positive 
sign. We can rewrite (8) as:9 
 
∫ ∂∂=
0
1
)(
i
i
p
p
i
i
dp
p
rryIE , 8’ 
                                                          
9 This uses the fact that for the profit maximizing price r=mc+1/((∂y/∂r)/y). 
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 price, cost 
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            r1 
 
 
         IE 
        mc0 
        mc1 
    ΔS 
 
         quantity 
 
 Figure 1 Effects of a decrease in input price 
 
which shows that the IE is equal to the change in consumers’ surplus. More 
pronounced results can be reached in special cases. When the demand function is 
linear and the cost function is homogeneous of degree 1 in output, the IE is equal 
to 50% of the direct effect; when the demand function is log-linear and the cost 
function is homogeneous of degree 1, the IE is equal to )1/( −εε times the direct 
effect, where ε  is absolute value of the (constant) price elasticity of demand. This 
implies that for ε  (larger than but) close to 1, the IE can be a large multiple of the 
direct effect, whereas for a large ε  it will be close to 100% of the direct effect. It 
appears therefore that the size of the IE depends to a considerable extent on the 
curvature of the demand curve. The large difference between the conclusions 
reached for linear and log-linear demand functions suggests that, for measuring 
the size of the IE correctly, it is of crucial importance to know if and how the 
price elasticity changes with the price  (i.e. the second order derivative of the 
demand curve). In practice it may not be easy to get the relevant information.  
The next section will show how additional indirect effects can occur under 
monopolistic competition. 
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4 Monopolistic competition with a given number of firms 
 
In the class of models we consider there is a (possibly) large number of firms n 
who each produce one variety of a differentiated product. All firms have identical 
linear cost functions and aggregate demand functions are symmetric in the sense 
that a permutation of the indices of the firms would not change the demand 
functions. The demand functions in the class of models we consider can be 
generated from a consumers’ surplus function CS(r1,…,rn) as follows: 
 
j
j r
CSy ∂
∂−=   9 
 
In general, the demand curve for j’s product depends not only on the price rj of 
firm j, but also on that of all other firms that are active in the market. This class 
covers, among others, the Dixit-Stiglitz model and the logit model of 
monopolistic competition. 
 All firms maximize their profits: 
 
),( pyKyrZ jjjj −=  10 
 
where K denotes the cost function: 
 
)()(),( pvypFpyK jj +=  11 
 
by setting their price and producing the corresponding market demand. The profit-
maximizing price satisfies: 
 
j
j
j
j
j
j r
yr
mcr ∂
∂=−= εε ,  12 
 
Market equilibrium in such an industry is characterized by equal prices and 
production volumes for all firms. In what follows we confine our attention to such 
market equilibria. Moreover, in the present section, we will take the number of 
firms as given. 
       Our welfare measure is the social surplus, now defined as the sum of the 
consumer surplus and the profits associated with each product (or firm). The 
change in this surplus that occurs, for instance, as a consequence of the lower 
price for input i is: 
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The change in consumer surplus that results from an infinitesimal change in the 
identical equilibrium prices of all firms is: ∑∑ −=∂∂= j jj j drydrrCSdCS )( . 
We can therefore write the total change in consumers’ surplus of a finite change in 
pi as: 
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The change in profits of firm j can be written in a similar way as: 
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whereas the direct effect of the change in input price i is: 
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where xji denotes the demand for input i by firm j.  
For later reference, we note that cost function (11) implies that we can 
rewrite the direct effect (16) as: 
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 This shows that the direct effect consists of two parts: one caused by the change in 
fixed cost, the other by the change in variable cost. The change in fixed cost does 
not result in a change in the output price10 and will only affect profits. 
It is now easy to obtain the total IE: 
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It must, however, be noted that in this case we cannot establish equality between 
the IE and the sum of the consumers’ surpluses. The reason is that the mark-up of 
each firm is now determined on the basis of the price elasticity of its demand with 
respect to its own price, i.e. holding the prices of all other varieties constant (cf. 
equation 12), whereas the partial derivatives ∂yj/∂r refer to changes in the prices 
of all varieties. We can, however, rewrite (18) as: 
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where ∂yj/∂rj is the partial derivative of the demand function for firm j with 
respect to its own price. The ratio of the partial derivatives that appears on the 
right-hand-side is smaller than 1, implying that the IE is smaller than the sum of 
the changes in the consumers’ surpluses. 
As in the monopoly case, we find that the IE is always positive when the 
mark up is positive, demand curves slope downward and the change in the input 
price induces a change in the output price. Note, however, that the demand curve 
for firm j must be downward sloping when the price of firm j’s output changes 
and also when the prices of the outputs of all firms 1,..n change simultaneously. 
Economic theory does not imply that the latter condition is satisfied, and this 
opens up the possibility of a negative IE.  Clearly, the general result for IE’s under 
monopolistic competition is even less informative than that under monopoly 
(where at least the sign of the IE was determined) and we have to look for special 
cases to derive more specific results.  
If the number of firms is large, the IE will decrease if the mark-up 
becomes smaller or (equivalently) if the absolute value of the price elasticity of 
demand increases. In the next section we will consider the model under conditions 
of free entry. 
 
                                                          
10 Cf. (12). 
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 5 Monopolistic competition with free entry 
 
The importance of considering the effects of free entry in relation to social CBA 
of investments in public infrastructure is suggested, for instance, by the work of 
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) who found that such investments left the size of 
the firms unchanged, but altered the number of firms substantially. 
To study the presence of IE’s under free entry in the context of the model 
developed in the previous section, we write consumers’ surplus as a function of 
the equilibrium price r and the number of firms n: ( )nrCSCS ,=  The latter 
variable will now be treated as continuous. Both r and n can depend on the price 
of input i via the variable cost v(p) and/or the fixed cost F(p). In general, n and r 
are general functions of both cost terms: ( ) ( )FvrrFvnn ,,, == . We can substitute 
these relationships into CS and in this way write consumer surplus as a function of 
the two cost terms. After doing so, we can write the change in consumers’ surplus 
that results from a change in the price of input i as: 
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Under free entry profits will always be equal to 0, and the change in social surplus 
is therefore equal to the change in consumers’ surplus: CSSS Δ=Δ . 
The direct effect of the change in the price of input i is: 
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where it must, again, be taken into account that both n and yj are functions of the 
input prices.  
The IE is equal to the difference between the change in social surplus and 
the direct effect. Since the former is equal to the change in consumers’ surplus, we 
can compute it by subtracting (21) from (20): 
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 An important aspect of this relationship is that it is not clear that the IE will 
always be nonnegative. In order to investigate the issue somewhat further, we 
write the partial derivatives of consumer surplus by first differentiating explicitly 
to n and r, and then further to the two cost components v and F.  We note from (9) 
that jnyrCS −=∂∂ and after substituting this result we find the following 
expression for the IE: 
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 22’ 
We expect consumers’ surplus to be increasing in the number of firms and the 
number of firms to be non-increasing in variable and fixed costs. We can also note 
that monopolistic price setting behavior usually implies that )( pvr ∂∂  is at least 
equal to 1.11 This implies that the IE can only be negative when ( ) 1<∂∂ Fry j . 
Since we cannot exclude this a priori, we must conclude that a negative IE is a 
real possibility under monopolistic competition with free entry. 
 
6 Examples 
 
The analysis of the previous two sections has taken us to a position in which it is 
useful to consider some specific examples. The section starts with considering 
three well known models of monopolistic competition with a given number of 
firms, and subsequently considers the free entry case for two of them.  
 
6.1 Linear demand curves  
We consider a market with a representative consumer who has a quasi-linear 
indirect utility function:12 
 
                                                          
11 This is the case when the demand curve is downward sloping (∂yj/∂r<0) and the second-order 
derivative of the natural logarithm of demand with respect to price is positive (∂2ln(y)/∂r2≥0). The 
latter condition says that the demand function is log-convex and most (if not all) demand curves 
used in empirical work satisfy this property. 
12 This model is used (with a continuum of varieties) in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and 
in Fujita and Thisse (2002, chapter 8,9). 
 
15
Rouwendal: Indirect Effects in Cost-Benefit Analysis
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Authenticated | 130.37.129.78
Download Date | 10/30/13 11:09 AM
 d
rrcrbrax
u
n
i
n
i
ji
n
i
i
n
i
i ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
=
∑∑∑∑
= === 1 11
2
1 2
1
2
1
 24 
 
where x denotes total consumption budget and the parameters a,b,c and d can be 
functions of the prices of consumer goods produced in other industries. For 
quasilinear utility functions, consumers’ surplus is a valid welfare measure, since 
Chipman and Moore (1976, 1980) have shown that for such functions the 
compensating variation is exactly equal to consumers’ surplus.13 Consumers’ 
surplus CS in (24) is equal to the term in brackets behind the minus sign in the 
numerator of the right-hand-side. 
The demand for variety j can be derived by means of Roy’s identity (or, 
equivalently, from consumers’ surplus) as: 
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++=
n
i
ijj rcrbay
1
 25 
 
We assume that b<0, and that b+c<0 in order to have a downward sloping 
demand curve for all firms. Moreover, total demand decreases when the market 
equilibrium price increases only if b+nc<0.  
Cost and profit functions for the firms have been defined above, and we 
proceed immediately to the computation of the IE as given in (18). From the 
profit-maximizing price, the mark-up can be found as: 
 
cb
y
vr jj +−=−  26 
 
The partial derivative of the demand function with respect to a change in the 
market equilibrium price follows from (25) as: 
 
cnb
r
y j +=∂
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 27 
 
whereas the partial derivative of the equilibrium price with respect to a change in 
input i can be determined from the mark-up equation (26) as:14 
                                                          
13 As long as we measure all prices relative to those of a numeraire outside consumption good 
whose price is kept constant. 
14 Note that demand yj also depends on the price pi through its dependence on r. 
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Adding the pieces together leads to the following expression for the IE: 
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where y denotes the sum of the demands for all varieties. 
It was noted above that in the case of a monopoly with a linear demand 
curve the IE equals 50% of the direct effect. We must now conclude that under 
monopolistic competition with linear demand curves, such a fixed ratio between 
direct and indirect effects does not exist. It can be inferred from (29), (14) and 
(28) that the IE is equal to a fraction ( )cbncb ++ /()  of consumers’ surplus. This 
fraction is positive and smaller than 1 if b+nc<0, zero if b+nc=0 and negative if 
b+nc>0. Depending on the parameters b and c, and the number of firms n, the IE 
can be a negligible fraction or a huge multiple of the direct effect of either sign. 
The analysis suggests that the number of firms, the steepness of the demand 
curves and the size of the substitution effects are the determinants of the sign and 
magnitude of the IE. 
 
6.2 The Dixit-Stiglitz model 
The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model is one of the oldest and best known models of 
monopolistic competition. It is used extensively in the new economic growth and 
new economic geography literature. Dixit and Stiglitz model the demand for a 
differentiated product by means of a representative consumer. We specify the 
utility of this consumer as15: 
 
ρ
ρα
/1
1
0 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
n
j
jyyU  30 
 
where α and ρ should be positive, moreover ρ should be smaller than 1.  
  Utility is maximized under a budget restriction: 
 
                                                          
15 Dixit and Stiglitz consider two generalizations of this utility function. The specification given 
here is usually employed in the subsequent literature. 
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The demand functions that result from this problem are: 
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Since the utility function in (30) is homothetic, consumers’ surplus CS provides a 
correct welfare measure as long as income does not change (Chipman and Moore, 
1980).16 Consumers’ surplus is: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−
+−= ∑= −
n
j
jr
XCS
1
)1/(ln1
1
ρρ
ρ
ρ
α  33 
 
and it is easy to verify that jj rCSy ∂∂−= . 
  Dixit and Stiglitz assume that firms take the denominator of the first term 
of demand function in (32) as given. The price set by such firms can then be 
derived as: 
 
ρ
)( pvrj =   34 
 
Using these equations, it is easy to compute the ingredients of (18) and the result 
is: 
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When fixed costs do not change, the ratio between the IE and the direct effect is ( ) ρρ /1− , which can take on any nonnegative value. When 1=ρ  all varieties are 
                                                          
16 However, it should be noted that in the change in consumers’ surplus is not equal to the 
compensating variation CV). The two are related as follows: CV/X=1-exp(-ΔCS/X) (see Chipman 
and Moore, 1980, p.945). This implies that different results with respect to the AIE will be reached 
if the CV is used. 
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 perfect substitutes and in this case the IE vanishes, which is intuitive. When ρ is 
close to 0, the IE may be a large multiple of the direct effects. 
      Since ρ is inversely related to the ‘preference for diversity’ of the 
representative consumer, we conclude that a strong preference for diversity leads 
to a large additional indirect effect. This result is in line with the one reached for 
monopoly under a loglinear demand curve. The result is also intuitive, since a 
strong preference for diversity implies relatively large monopoly power for the 
individual firms. The IE is equal to a fraction (1- ρ ) of the change in consumers’ 
surplus. 
 Note that the number of firms, n, does not appear in (35). This implies that 
the size of the IE does not tend to zero when the number of firms gets large. The 
results of the present subsection are somewhat more positive than that of the 
previous one in that we can exclude negative IE in the Dixit-Stiglitz model and 
that the size of the IE can be related to a key parameter of the model in an 
intuitive way. 
 
6.3 The logit model of monopolistic competition 
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, and earlier papers referred to in that book) 
used the logit model in order to study an industry with differentiated products. 
They made use of the representative consumer theory of that model developed in 
McFadden (1981). 
The indirect utility function of the representative consumer is: 
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This indirect utility function is quasi-linear, like the one in the model with linear 
demand equations. This implies that consumers’ surplus, which is equal to μ times 
the second term on the right-hand-side can be used as the appropriate welfare 
measure.17  The representative consumer buys one unit of the product per period 
and the size of the market is equal to N. The probability that variety k will be 
chosen is: 
 
                                                          
17 This is sometimes referred to as the logsum. 
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The expected demand for the product j is therefore equal to Nπj. We treat the πj’s 
as (deterministic) market shares. The implied demand function is similar to that of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model with the (natural) logarithm of the price used instead of 
the untransformed price. The comparison between these two models is therefore 
similar to that between the linear and loglinear demand function for the monopoly 
case. 
The optimal price is: 
 
j
j pvr π
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Computation of the IE is particularly easy for the logit model, since total demand 
is always equal to N. In a symmetric equilibrium each firm has a market share 1/n, 
independent of the value of the equilibrium price r.  Hence 0/ =∂∂ ry j  for each 
firm and the IE is always equal to 0. 
 
6.4 Dixit-Stiglitz model with free entry 
CS for the Dixit-Stiglitz model was given in (33) and now we rewrite it as: 
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The profit maximizing price was given in (34), and the zero profit condition 
implies that the number of firms n equals: 
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After substitution of these results in (39) we can compute the partial derivatives: 
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From (22) we now derive the IE as: 
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Comparison with (35) shows that a new term has been added that represents the 
effect of entry. Entry therefore causes a second additional indirect effect that is 
also positive. The conclusions reached for the Dixit-Stiglitz model do therefore 
not change substantially when we allow for entry (or exit) of firms. 
 
6.5 The logit model with free entry 
From (36) we rewrite the sum of the consumers’ surpluses for the N consumers in 
the logit model in market equilibrium as: 
 ( )( )rnNCS −= lnμ  44 
 
The profit maximizing price was given in (38) and with free entry the number of 
firms is: 
1
)(
+=
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This shows that the number of firms is independent of the variable cost, that is, 
0=∂∂ vn . Note, from (38), that 1)(/ =∂∂ pvr . This implies that the first term on 
the right-hand-side of (22’) (or (22)) is identically 0.  
To find the sign of the second term, note that it follows from (45) that: 
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Using this result we find for the IE: 
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 The most important aspect of (47) is its sign: the additional indirect effect 
turns out to be negative in this case. Even though we could, in section 5, not 
determine the sign of the IE in the case of free entry, it seemed intuitively 
plausible that it would be positive. The negative sign of the IE in equation (47) 
shows that in the case of the logit model with free entry the change in consumers’ 
surplus overestimates the true welfare gain of the project. Note, however, that the 
bias associated with using the direct effect is small if the preference for diversity 
(measured by μ), is small, or if the fixed cost is large (or both). 
 
7 Implications for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Investments in public infrastructure often result in decreases in cost for industries 
that use this infrastructure. If these industries are imperfectly competitive, they 
may generate IEs. If we want to incorporate these effects in a CBA, a study of the 
way the effects of policy measures pass through the economy to the consumers is 
necessary. The setting we considered in the previous sections is one of the 
simplest that serves this purpose. A number of conclusions can be drawn. 
First, under the class of monopolistic competition models that we have 
considered, IE’s exist in general and they may take on any logically possible 
value. That is, they may have the same order of magnitude as the conventionally 
measured direct effects, may be much smaller or may exceed them substantially. 
Thus there is a real possibility that conventional CBA substantially underestimates 
or overestimates the true welfare gains of a project resulting in an input price 
change. 
Second, since the sign of the additional indirect effect is indeterminate: it 
is possible that conventional CBA overestimates the welfare effect of an 
investment resulting in a change in an input price by ignoring the additional 
indirect. 
Third, the details of the model specification or even the size of the 
parameters can be of crucial importance for the sign and size of the IE’s. This is 
most dramatically the case for the model with linear demand curves. This 
conclusion confirms the few results that are available in the literature: Venables 
and Gasiorek (1998) found substantial positive IEs in simulation results, whereas 
Newbery (1998) showed that the IE may be negative. Since the only difference 
between the various models we considered here is the specification of the demand 
functions, we can conclude that their curvature is of crucial importance for the 
generation of IEs.  
The relevance of these results for the ‘Aschauer debate’ is that they 
provide a possible explanation for the wide range of empirical results with respect 
to the total welfare effects of investments in public infrastructure. These results 
may not only be due to differences in econometric techniques and data quality, but 
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 may also have to do with (apparently) small differences in the demand functions 
that are relevant for the cases studied. Also misspecification of the demand 
functions may have important consequences for the conclusions drawn. 
The analysis in the present paper suggests that trustworthy measurement of 
the IE’s associated with actual investments in public infrastructure may well be 
practically impossible. A major conclusion is that ‘the devil is in the details’ and 
since these details may differ between investments that are similar in many 
respects (for instance because expanding the capacity of road infrastructure affects 
different industries depending on the location of the investment) generally 
applicable rules of thumb are unlikely to exist. Moreover, an in-depth 
investigation of the IE’s associated with a specific project will usually be too 
costly. Since small differences in model specifications may well lead to 
substantially different conclusions the ability for such research to be of assistance 
in settling debates about indirect effects is probably limited. In short, the 
possibilities for addressing IE’s in social CBA seem to be fairly limited at present. 
The presence of IE’s is directly related to distortions in the resource 
allocation process associated with imperfect competition. Including these IEs in a 
CBA implies that one takes into account the mitigating (or exaggerating) effect of 
the project on existing market distortions. In general, it would be preferable to 
address these distortions by direct means such as the improvement of competition. 
Even though the presence of imperfect competition in many parts of the economy 
suggests that such first best policies are out of reach, it is nevertheless important 
to keep in mind that there may be other ways, which are possibly to be preferred, 
to mitigate the effects of such market distortions. 
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